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This Article analyzes whether mandatory website disclosure of e standard terms, advocated by some as a potential solution to market failures when consumers contract over the Internet, is another potential legal back fire. By mandatory website disclosure, I do not mean a "clickwrap" presentation of terms, in which a consumer must click "I agree" or the like on a screen presenting the terms prior to the completion of a transaction in progress.
5 Mandatory website disclosure would require a business to main tain an Internet presence and to post its terms prior to any particular transaction so that a consumer could read and compare terms without mak ing a purchase at all.
The problem is not that mandatory website disclosure would increase the cost of doing business, which would be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. Businesses have been unable to demonstrate that dis playing their terms on their websites would be costly. 6 Nor should drafting rules that implement the law be too difficult. 7 Businesses could be required to display their terms on their homepage or on another page reachable di-
4.
See Hillman, supra note 1, at 819-20. Here are some more examples of possible legal backfires:
The Environmental Protection Agency's actions to regulate coal-burning power plants is "so inept that some of the nation's most populous areas will end up with a worse environment than would have resulted if the new policy had never been put into effect. of increased the broadcasting of diverse viewpoints .... The fuel economy standards imposed on automobile manufacturers increased rather than decreased our dependence on foreign oil.
rectly through a clearly identified hyperlink. Further, businesses could be required to prove the availability of their terms by furnishing relatively in expensive archival records of their websites. Mandatory website disclosure may backfire, however, because it may not increase reading or shopping for terms or motivate businesses to draft reasonable ones, but instead, may make heretofore suspect terms more likely enforceable. 8
Part I reviews why market forces may fail adequately to police standard forms on the Internet. It summarizes previous work in which I report that, despite the relative luxury of time and the lack of sales pressure, consumers generally do not read their e-standard forms presented during a transaction beyond price and the description of the goods and rarely shop for terms. 9 As a result, market pressure may be insufficient to deter some businesses from overreaching.
Part II shows that mandatory website disclosure as a remedy for market failure is worthy of a focused analysis because its surface attractiveness means that lawmakers are likely to adopt it. Mandatory website disclosure is appealing because, in theory, it would increase the numbers of readers of and shoppers for standard terms, who would have time to contemplate and compare terms, or, at least, it would increase the opportunity to read and shop for terms. Further, mandatory website disclosure would help motivate businesses to write fair terms in order to avoid losing customers to competi tors with better terms or to avoid adverse publicity from watchdog groups that can monitor websites and spread the word about unreasonable terms quickly and easily over the Internet. Mandatory website disclosure, there fore, arguably would promote reasonable terms, decrease the instances of market failure, and legitimize the idea that e-purchasers have assented, at least impliedly, to the terms.1 0 Further, mandatory website disclosure would not be too expensive or administratively infeasible.11
Part III addresses whether mandatory website disclosure can succeed.
Despite its appeal, I worry that it may not achieve its objectives, or worse, may backfire. My preliminary empirical work on e-consumer reading of standard forms, as well as studies of e-shopping behavior, suggests that ad vance disclosure of terms likely will fail to increase reading or shopping for 
10.
Braucher, supra note 6, at 768 ("To force advance disclosure that facilitates shopping and thus market policing, courts should find no agreement to mass-market terms not publicly available before a customer initiates an order.").
11.
See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
12.
My survey results show that only four percent of purchasers generally read their e purchase contracts beyond price and product description. See Hillman, supra note 9; see also Clay ton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 679, 687-88 (2004) ("It is unlikely that the Internet buyer will devote more time to reading text on the website than more traditional buyers devote to reviewing the terms of tangible [standard forms].").
e-consumers may still have ample rational reasons for not reading and cog nitive processes that deter reading and processing terms. 1 3 In addition, e consumers, drawn to the speed and novelty of the Internet, are unlikely to have the patience or discipline to compare terms regardless of when the terms become available. Further, watchdog groups may not positively moti vate businesses because they may lack influence and because businesses may conclude that the benefits of particular terms outweigh any potential costs in adverse publicity.
In light of the potential failure of mandatory website disclosure to in crease re ading and to discipline businesses, the only effects of the proposal may be to insulate businesses from claims of procedural unconscionability and to create a safe harbor for businesses to draft suspect terms. My goal is not to claim that mandatory website disclosure will certainly backfire so that the proposal should be taken off the table. In fact, I conclude that mandatory website disclosure ultimately may be the most viable alternative. I simply want to elaborate on the reasons that the possibility of backfire should be taken seriously before moving in the direction of mandatory website disclo sure.
I. T HE E -S TANDARD-F ORM E NVIRONMENT

A. Do Consumers Read Their £-Standard Fonns?
Professor Rachlinski and I maintained that the e-standard-form environment presented consumers with several advantages:
Several factors suggest that consumers can defend themselves against un desirable terms more easily in the electronic environment. E-consumers can shop in the privacy of their own homes, where they can make careful decisions with fewer time constraints. They can leave their computers and return before completing their transactions, giving them time to think and investigate further. Also, at present, e-consumers tend to be better educated and wealthier than paper-world consumers, suggesting that they can better fend for themselves in the marketplace.
The Internet has also taken comparison shopping to a level that is unimag inable in the real world. The ease with which consumers can compare business practices, including the content of standard forms, suggests that consumers do not need judicial intervention to protect themselves from business abuse. 14 Notwithstanding these benefits, we saw several pitfalls for consumers in the e-world, consisting of either rational, cognitive, or social reasons for failing to read terms or to consider them in their decisions. Some of the ra tional reasons coincide with paper-world barriers to reading, such as
13.
Even consumers who read their terms do not necessarily account for them in their deci sionmaking. See generally Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Un conscionability, 70 U. Cm. L. REv. 1203 (2003).
14.
Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 478 (footnotes omitted).
boilerplate's lack of lucidity, consumers' lack of bargaining power and choices, and the relative likelihood that nothing will go wrong. 1 5 In addition, the e-environment adds to the futility of reading because of the lack of a live contracting partner and the time and effort necessary to locate terms that e businesses can easily hide. 1 6 In short, e-consumers may rationally compare the costs and benefits of reading terms and find a net benefit in spending their time on another activity.
Cognitive reasons for failing to read and process terms also coincide with those in the paper world. These include consumers' propensity to equate "low probability" risks with "zero probability" risks, 17 and their ten dencies to digest a limited quantity of information and to rely instead on hunches and processes that simplify decisionmaking. 25. Hillman, supra note 9. The survey inquired, among other things, about the frequency of electronic contracting, the subject matter (purchases or subscriptions), the place and time of making such contracts, the extent to which participants read forms, the particular terms read, the reasons for not reading, and conditions and mechanisms that would promote reading. The survey also compared the practices of men and women and of frequent and occasional users.
Respondents could select more than one response to many of the questions discussed infra in text accompanying footnotes 26-31. Competition for market share in the e-environment may therefore deter businesses from drafting onerous terms or even motivate them to write terms favorable to consumers.
3 7 Because e-consumers can easily spread the word about the nature of the terms, the Internet should increase this incentive. 38
However, market pressure may be insufficient to discipline businesses. 39
In insufficiently competitive industries, businesses can afford to lose the small cadre of readers and dictate onerous terms to the nonreaders. 4° Further, in more competitive climates, businesses may be able to identify readers and offer them more favorable terms. E-technology facilitates such segregation by enabling businesses to gather data on consumer behavior on the Inter net. 41
In addition, e-commerce offers businesses new and inexpensive strate gies for manipulating consumers to minimize standard-term shopping. As
Rachlinski and I pointed out, businesses can experiment with modes of presentation, including methods of accessing the standard terms, graphics, 
38.
Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 470; Katz, supra note 37, at 505 ("If reputational concerns lead drafters of forms to moderate their opportunism, regulation may be largely unneces sary. ").
39.
There is ample evidence that some businesses seek to take advantage of consumers. See, e.g. and font sizes, to determine which presentations most effectively deter read ing, and can use those strategies when the consumer decides to contract. 42
In the article reporting my survey, I evaluated various proposals for in tervention in the e-market on the assumption that market failures exist and that the benefits of regulation exceed its costs. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 479. Rachlinski and I also noted:
Studies of e-commerce confirm the suspicion that the Internet is not yet a consumer's paradise. In theory, the easy access to information that the Internet provides should reduce prices and reduce price dispersion between businesses that supply similar goods. Although e-commerce has had this effect on some commodities, wide dispersions in prices can be found. In some cases, the disparities are no lower on the Internet than in the real world. These results indicate that e-consumers have yet to exploit the full benefits of the electronic environment. Despite the Internet's apparent benefits for consumers, these fi ndings reveal that businesses still have many opportunities to exploit consumers' lack of information about goods and services.
Id. at 473-74 (footnotes omitted). (discussing courts' varying requirements regarding "conspicuousness" in disclaimers of implied warranties under the UCC). My survey of contracts students' e-standard-form practices revealed that the respondents were more likely to read if they were required to click "I agree" at the end of each term (49% or 45/92). Forty-two percent (39/92) of respondents also thought that they would read bold or otherwise highlighted text. Only 24% (22/92) thought they would read terms presented in a pop-up window and 23% (21/92) thought they would read when the terms appear on the screen as a series of individual windows that must be clicked. Clicking "I agree" at the end of all of the terms would induce reading among only 17% of the respondents (16/92). Perhaps the most signifi cant finding is that only 5% (5/92) of the respondents are more likely to read when they "must click" on a link to another page to read the terms. This "browsewrap" strategy, however, is heavily utilized by online merchants.
Respondents could select more than one response to the questions discussed here. 
II. THE P OTENTIAL B ENEFITS OF M ANDATORY W EBSITE D ISCLOSURE
To assess whether the law should require businesses to make their stan dard forms available on their websites so that consumers can peruse them even before deciding to make a purchase, lawmakers should assess the costs and benefits of doing so. This Part shows that a very promising theoretical case for mandatory website disclosure can be made. Nonetheless, in Part III, I confess to serious reservations about whether mandatory website disclo sure can be successful.
In theory, mandatory website disclosure would increase the number of readers of standard forms and shoppers for terms to a level that businesses could not ignore. Further, mandatory website disclosure would allow con to read the standard terms before deciding whether to enter into the contract, then courts should apply Llewellyn's presumption of enforceability of such terms. Just as in the paper world, consum ers understand the existence of standard terms and agree to be bound by them, even though they rarely choose to read them." (footnote omitted)). 
55.
Other factors, such as a lack of alternative terms, still may make a consumer's assent rather artificial, of course. Of course, consumers may have limited choices because of the commonality of terms within an indus try. Common terms do not necessarily indicate collusion among businesses, however. Instead it may mean that the terms are efficient. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 439 ("Because the best allocation of risks is not likely to vary between businesses within an industry, most businesses will offer terms similar to those offered by their competitors. Less experienced businesses simply copy their senior counterparts. Uniformity of terms within an industry, in fact, might indicate that the industry is highly competitive." (footnote omitted)). It is an essentially human tendency to refuse to believe sad events and to invent happy ones. What the lawmaker sometimes tries to do is precisely this-to efface unfortunate realities as far as possible and to evoke the shades of fortunate realities which have not been achieved ... While the fiction is a subtle instrument of juridical technique, it is also clearly the expression of a desire inherent in human nature, the desire to efface unpleasant realities and evoke imagi nary good fortune.
MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 163 (1993).
61. See infra notes 62, 77-81 and accompanying text for a discussion.
62.
According to one study, e-shoppers may be confident or apprehensive, and highly in volved or apathetic. Letecia N. McKinney, Internet Shopping Orientation Segments: An Exploration [Vol. 104:837
The obvious costs of mandatory website disclosure should not be too high because displaying standard forms on a website should be inexpensive.
In fact, to date, businesses have failed to mount an effective argument against the requirement. 6 3 Nor should lawmakers have insurmountable prob lems drafting rules that successfully implement disclosure. 
64.
See Braucher, Delayed Disclosure, supra note 63, at 1807-08.
65. "There are design prescriptions gleaned from empirical studies of web-searching behav ior that claim that if in three clicks users do not find information that at least suggests they are on the right track, they will leave the site." Gary M. Mandatory website disclosure targets businesses by enforcing only those terms that appear on a business's website prior to a transaction. Such a rule, of course, does not mandate the content of terms. Disclosure is intended to influence businesses to write reasonable terms on the theory that more con sumers will read and shop for terms or that watchdog groups will publicize adverse terms.
The problem is that people do not always act the way lawmakers predict, and therefore, laws designed to achieve purposes by influencing people's conduct can go astray, or even backfire. 68 For example, the Endangered Spe cies Act, mentioned in the Introduction to this Article, may threaten the creatures it was designed to protect because lawmakers failed to predict that landowners would lawfully destroy potential habitats so that listed species would not occupy them. 69 Hate crimes laws may decrease social harmony by focusing people's attention on "conflict between races, genders, and nation ality groups"70 and by creating the perception that such crimes occur more frequently than they do in reality. 7 1 Will mandatory website disclosure also backfire?
Disclosure as a Method of Increasing Reading
To make a long story short, mandatory website disclosure may fail to in crease reading and shopping for terms. This is not a revelation, of course.
Many commentators seem to have lost faith in disclosure as a remedy for market failures in standard-form contracting partly because they have seen 68. Hillman, supra note I, at 846-47.
69. Gidari, supra note 3, at 424 ("Because of the habitat modification restrictions ... land owners are taking pains to manage their lands so that protected, or potentially protectable, species do not occupy the site. "). Mandatory website disclosure may not increase reading and shopping because most of the rational, cognitive, and emotional reasons consumers do not read terms still apply regardless of when businesses display the terms.
JACOBS
Businesses can still hide behind legalese and consumers, who do not have bargaining power, will continue to process information selectively and to believe that nothing will go wrong. 75 In fact, by increasing the information available to consumers, the early display of terms may add to the problem of information overload. 76 Further, without the immediacy of an actual transac tion, consumers may find plowing through legalese more tedious and worthless than ever.
Perhaps most important, if consumers are truly "click happy," they are unlikely to settle down simply because of advance disclosure of terms. (2002) ("Consumer disclosures retain their appeal for lawmakers despite the growing realization that they do not work. Existing disclosure forms, meant to remedy the incomprehensibility of consumer transactions, are viewed widely as inadequate to the task."); Whitford, supra note 57, at 420 ("[T]he evidence presently available sug gests that any success truth-in-lending will have inducing credit shopping for lower interest rates will be modest and concentrated among higher income groups."); id. at 403 ("The continued reli ance on disclosure as an important technique for regulating consumer transactions is contrary to the advice of many commentators, who have argued that although not positively harmful, such regula tion is typically almost useless.").
Some 
74.
Some analysts are not optimistic that mandatory website disclosure of terms will in crease reading of standard forms. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note I 2, at 687-88 ("It is unlikely that the Internet buyer will devote more time to reading text on the website than more traditional buyers devote to reviewing the terms of tangible [standard forms].").
75.
Hillman, supra note 34, at 757 & n.79. Analysis of such shopping is still relatively novel, but early reports are not promising. One study identifies two major types of shoppers on the Inter net. 7 7 One type, the "convenience" shopper, has a particular purchase in mind and rationally uses the Internet to reduce search costs, such as by us ing a search engine to gather information on a product and compare prices and by reading product reviews online. 78 The "recreational" shopper, on the other hand, shops for the sheer enjoyment of the experience and, stimulated by the interactive nature of the Internet, often purchases impulsively.
79 Rec reational shoppers "may be driven by need to purchase rather than need fo r a product." 80 Analysts report that recreation may be "more important than convenience for online shoppers." 81 Even shoppers who begin their shopping experience rationally to reduce the costs of their transaction may ultimately engage in impulse buying. 8 2 The Internet environment apparently contributes to impulse purchasing because of its anonymity (people purchasing impul sively prefer privacy), availability twenty-four hours a day, and other "recreational shopping features," such as "e-mail alerts of new products ...
[and] special offers." 83
In short, the online environment may contribute to impulsivity and even addictive purchasing among consumers. the like, the likelihood seems small that people will take the time to do so.
In short, the lack of a hard copy probably contributes to consumers' lack of reading of their standard forms.
determinant of online buying activity than either rational or economic expectations about the cost and convenience of Internet shopping or the personal and economic characteristics of e-commerce consumers."). 
89.
Metzger, sup ra note 84.
90.
For example, at the moment that I am typing this, I am experiencing pain in my shoulder and neck from looking at this manuscript on the screen. This is likely bad for my tennis.
Watchdog Groups
As discussed, mandatory website disclosure might create incentives for businesses to write reasonable terms because watchdog groups can spread the word about unreasonable terms. The problem is that although the fear of watchdog groups may create incentives to avoid drafting outrageous terms (that would be stricken today under unconscionability or related law any way), this concern may be insufficient to deter businesses from drafting marginal terms that may not create significant reputational concerns but would harm consumers just the same. For example, a business that is wary of watchdog groups may shy away from a term that requires a consumer to reimburse the business's attorneys' fees and costs regardless of the outcome of a dispute or to arbitrate in a non-neutral setting, 91 but such terms may be unenforceable on unconscionability grounds anyway. On the other hand, a firm may decide that the benefits of a forum-selection clause that is incon venient for the consumer or a term allowing an Internet site to "collect[] certain non-personally identifiable information about a consumer's web surfing and computer usage," 92 outweighs the costs of whatever bad press they may produce. And, as I will discuss more fully below, such terms may be enforceable if disclosed on a business's website because of the absence of procedural unconscionability.
The efficacy of watchdog groups also depends on whether consumers and news services access the groups' websites and whether visitors to these sites publicize the information. This will depend in tum on the reputations of the watchdogs, as well as the reliability and timeliness of their information. Cur rently, apparently because of insufficient resources and questionable consumer interest, many watchdog groups monitor only large software developers. The success of watchdog groups has yet to be proven.
B. Legal Ramifications of Mandatory We bsite Disclosure When Consumers Do Not Read and Shop
An ominous possibility is that mandatory website disclosure will back fire and create a safe haven for businesses that are seeking to write marginal, but not outrageous terms. Terms once potentially stricken on unconscion ability or related grounds might be enforceable because of their reasonable disclosure.
Most cases entertaining an unconscionability or related claim, including those involving e-commerce, look for both procedural and substantive 91. See Kunz et al., supra note 65, at 280-81 ("[T]he terms most commonly providing the impetus to challenge the validity of electronic standard-form agreements are dispute resolution clauses, forum selection clauses, disclaimers of warranty, limitations of liability, and prohibitions on the commercial use of the data or software available on the site." (footnotes omitted)).
92. Magid, supra note 31 (discussing the licensing agreement that accompanies Gain Pub lishing's eWallet software, which authorizes the collection of data about a consumer's reading behavior, TV interests, and communication partners, effectively allowing the company to "follow [the transferee] around"). The result of mandatory website disclosure would constitute a legal backfire. Mandatory website disclosure would narrow consumer rights rather than expand them. Although the Critical Legal Studies movement once claimed that laws seemingly designed to even the playing field are part of a conspiracy of the elite to "justify the prevailing conditions of social life and erect ... barriers to social change," 1 00 the motive for adopting manda-tory website disclosure would be benign. Still, lawmakers must understand that their predictions about how people will respond to a law can miss the mark and must realize that a disclosure strategy may inadvertently place consumers in a worse position than the status quo and even forestall other 101 attempts at reform.
C ONCLUSION
Despite all that has been said, mandatory website disclosure may still be the best strategy for dealing with the problem of e-standard forms. As men tioned, other solutions present significant problems of their own. 1 02 Further, mandatory website disclosure is cheap, substantiates the claim of consumer assent, and constitutes a symbolic victory for those advocating greater fair ness in e-standard-form contracting.
Of course, mandatory website disclosure is attractive for these reasons only if my fear of a legal backfire proves exaggerated because the benefits of disclosure outweigh the costs of the enforcement of some questionable terms. And perhaps I am being unduly pessimistic about the possibility that disclosure will backfire. After all, if disclosure were a good strategy for businesses to avoid unconscionability claims and of little concern because consumers do not read their standard forms, one would expect to see lots of precontract disclosure of e-standard forms already. Businesses tempted to draft unfair terms must therefore believe that disclosure benefits consumers. the outcome of disclosure and therefore prefer to hide their marginal terms, even though disclosing them actually would work to their advantage.
Ultimately, optimism about disclosure may depend on one's time frame for measuring the law's effects. Even if disclosure backfires in the short term, perhaps eventually the word will get out about a business's unsavory terms. Consider the experience of cigarette manufacturers who, in response to legislation, put warning labels on their packages. For a considerable pe riod of time, these labels helped manufacturers " 'fend[] off smokers' suits' " based on smokers ' assumption of the risk.
104 As a result, " ' [ w ]hat was in tended as a burden on tobacco became a shield instead.' " 1 0 5 In the long run, however, the package warnings, along with the many revelations about ciga rette manufacturers' attempts to hide other adverse facts about their products, led to a massive change in public opinion and, ultimately, to seri ous legal sanctions against the cigarette companies. 1 06 Perhaps mandatory website disclosure will also have a long-term beneficial effect.
proceed to correct them. These assumptions are rarely met either in the case of entry or in other legally significant real-world settings." (footnote omitted)). 
